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Executive Compensation and Financial Performance Measures: Evidence from Significant Financial Institutions
Author(s) -
Le Cao Hoang Anh,
Shan Yaowen,
Taylor Stephen
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
australian accounting review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.551
H-Index - 36
eISSN - 1835-2561
pISSN - 1035-6908
DOI - 10.1111/auar.12315
Subject(s) - accounting , business , remuneration , executive compensation , earnings , equity (law) , incentive , cash , earnings per share , finance , economics , corporate governance , microeconomics , political science , law
We survey the use of financial performance measures in determining executive pay among significant Australian financial institutions. We document evidence of the pervasiveness with which externally disclosed non‐GAAP (non‐Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) financial measures are also used internally to determine variable remuneration, with the apparent popularity of cash profit after tax in short‐term incentives plans. Our evidence also highlights the increasing use of peer group‐adjusted measures (e.g., relative cash earnings per share and return on equity ranking against a peer group) in determining longer‐run incentives, despite the fact that members of the peer group do not measure financial performance in a directly comparable manner. Detailed analysis of the four major trading banks (Australia and New Zealand Banking Group, Commonwealth Bank, National Australia Bank and Westpac) reveals differences in the way non‐GAAP earnings measures are calculated across the major banks, as well as some variation over time in the way individual banks measure performance. We also document evidence of non‐GAAP earnings restatements, with around 25% of non‐GAAP results subsequently being restated. These restatements are more likely to result in a downward revision of the initially reported non‐GAAP result than an upward revision. We therefore conclude that existing measures of financial performance used to determine senior executive compensation are not as ‘objective’, as might be assumed.