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Opportunity and Willingness of Collective Action: Elections in India
Author(s) -
Roy Swetasree
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
asian politics and policy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.193
H-Index - 12
eISSN - 1943-0787
pISSN - 1943-0779
DOI - 10.1111/aspp.12518
Subject(s) - collective action , dilemma , action (physics) , argument (complex analysis) , government (linguistics) , politics , political science , social psychology , positive economics , law and economics , political economy , economics , public relations , psychology , law , epistemology , philosophy , biochemistry , physics , chemistry , linguistics , quantum mechanics
Scholars argue that collective action is possible if and only if rebel groups can solve their dilemma of non‐participation. This paper examines whether opportunity can help resolve the rebel’s dilemma and increase participation in collective action. Scholars contend that presence of representative government provides many solutions to the rebel’s dilemma. In this paper, the author tests the validity of this argument in the present times. Using a mid‐level theory of opportunity and willingness on panel data of 28 Indian states from 2001–2012, results show that an open political system does not automatically signal opportunity for rioting. Risk is significant only when there is a willingness to use the opportunity. An interaction of the political opportunity and willingness to riot reduces the rebel’s dilemma of non‐participation, thereby increasing the risk of violent collective action. Interestingly, some old predictors of collective action like wealth, education, and youth bulge do not find support here.