Explaining Government Turnover in A sian Democracies

What explains the Japanese experience of one‐party‐dominated democracy over the past five decades? More generally, and looking across A sian democracies, what explains variations in the degree of political volatility? We propose a theory of government turnover rate that not only explains political rigidity in J apan and the experience of precarious democracy in T hailand and the P hilippines, but also explains changes of government in other A sian democracies. Political volatility, defined as the rate of government turnover, ranges from very low, as seen in one‐party‐dominated democracies, to very high, as seen in troubled democracies that regularly suffer democratic breakdowns. With our theory, we argue that three major factors contribute interactively to political volatility: executive type, distributive power, and social cleavage. Through a comparative analysis of all A sian democracies, we conclude that the mechanisms resulting in political volatility can be generalized in a unifying theoretical framework.