Retrenchment as a Screening Mechanism: Power Shifts, Strategic Withdrawal, and Credible Signals

Both advocates and opponents of retrenchment have treated it as an undesirable, last‐ditch strategy for states that have already experienced severe decline. This article presents a formal model that identifies an unrecognized benefit of retrenchment: It can provide declining states with valuable information about rising states' future intentions. By removing constraints over the behavior of rising states in a particular region, a declining state can induce hostile risers to attempt revision of the regional order. This, in turn, makes a riser's cooperative behavior more credible as a signal of benign intentions, allowing the decliner to oppose hostile types while accommodating benign ones. In contrast to the existing focus on retrenchment as a desperate strategy taken from a position of weakness, this article suggests that the informational benefits of retrenchment are greatest when it is undertaken early, from a position of strength.