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Retrenchment as a Screening Mechanism: Power Shifts, Strategic Withdrawal, and Credible Signals
Author(s) -
Yoder Brandon K.
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
american journal of political science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 6.347
H-Index - 170
eISSN - 1540-5907
pISSN - 0092-5853
DOI - 10.1111/ajps.12395
Subject(s) - retrenchment , position (finance) , mechanism (biology) , state (computer science) , power (physics) , focus (optics) , economics , political science , computer science , public administration , finance , philosophy , physics , epistemology , algorithm , quantum mechanics , optics
Both advocates and opponents of retrenchment have treated it as an undesirable, last‐ditch strategy for states that have already experienced severe decline. This article presents a formal model that identifies an unrecognized benefit of retrenchment: It can provide declining states with valuable information about rising states' future intentions. By removing constraints over the behavior of rising states in a particular region, a declining state can induce hostile risers to attempt revision of the regional order. This, in turn, makes a riser's cooperative behavior more credible as a signal of benign intentions, allowing the decliner to oppose hostile types while accommodating benign ones. In contrast to the existing focus on retrenchment as a desperate strategy taken from a position of weakness, this article suggests that the informational benefits of retrenchment are greatest when it is undertaken early, from a position of strength.