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Courting the President: How Circuit Court Judges Alter Their Behavior for Promotion to the Supreme Court
Author(s) -
Black Ryan C.,
Owens Ryan J.
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
american journal of political science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 6.347
H-Index - 170
eISSN - 1540-5907
pISSN - 0092-5853
DOI - 10.1111/ajps.12132
Subject(s) - dissenting opinion , supreme court , political science , argument (complex analysis) , law , sacrifice , promotion (chess) , empirical research , certiorari , psychology , original jurisdiction , politics , statistics , history , biochemistry , chemistry , mathematics , archaeology
We examine whether circuit court judges sacrifice policy purity for career goals. We compare the behavior of contender judges–those most likely to be elevated to the Supreme Court–during vacancy periods with their behavior outside vacancy periods. We also examine the behavior of noncontender judges during those same times. The data show that during vacancy periods, contender judges are more likely to vote consistently with the president's preferences, to rule in favor of the United States, and to write dissenting opinions. Noncontender judges fail to evidence such behavior. These findings provide empirical support for the argument that federal judges adapt their behavior to specific audiences, and provide new avenues for research into judges' goals and the role of audiences in judicial decision making.