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Political Capital: An Analysis of Congress Voting on the Financial Regulations
Author(s) -
Hao Xiaoting,
Kim YongCheol,
Lim Yuree
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
asia‐pacific journal of financial studies
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.375
H-Index - 15
eISSN - 2041-6156
pISSN - 2041-9945
DOI - 10.1111/ajfs.12282
Subject(s) - voting , deregulation , politics , house of representatives , capital (architecture) , public administration , political capital , voting behavior , economics , finance , business , political science , financial system , political economy , market economy , law , archaeology , history
We find that members of the House of Representatives who vote for deregulation are more likely to be employed in the private sector after leaving Congress than those who do not vote for deregulation. An analysis of voting behavior in a major financial regulation—the Gramm‐Leach‐Bliley Act of 1999—shows that representatives use voting to enhance their careers. The results are consistent with politicians' public rent‐seeking and show that political capital is as valuable for politicians as it is for companies.