Say‐on‐pay judgements: the two‐strikes rule and the pay‐performance link | Zendy

Liang Yimeng | Zendy; Moroney Robyn | Zendy; Rankin Michaela | Zendy

AI Assistant Blog Pricing

Home ZAIA Blog

Premium

Say‐on‐pay judgements: the two‐strikes rule and the pay‐performance link

Author(s) -

Liang Yimeng,

Moroney Robyn,

Rankin Michaela

Publication year - 2020

Publication title -

accounting and finance

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 0.645

H-Index - 49

eISSN - 1467-629X

pISSN - 0810-5391

DOI - 10.1111/acfi.12391

Subject(s) - remuneration , shareholder , link (geometry) , voting , business , accounting , economics , corporate governance , finance , political science , computer science , law , computer network , politics

We undertake an experiment to explore shareholder voting behaviour when the pay‐performance link is weak or strong; and when there has (has not) been a first strike in the preceding year. We find shareholders are more supportive of a remuneration package evidencing a strong pay‐performance link than a weak link. Further, shareholders are less supportive of a remuneration package when there has been a first strike in the preceding year than when there has not been a first strike. Importantly, we find that a first strike reduces the effect of the pay‐performance link on voting intentions.

This content is not available in your region!

Continue researching here.

Having issues? You can contact us here

Accelerating Research