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Changing board behaviour: The role of the ‘Two Strikes’ rule in improving the efficacy of Australian Say‐on‐Pay
Author(s) -
Borthwick James,
Jun Aelee,
Ma Shiguang
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
accounting and finance
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.645
H-Index - 49
eISSN - 1467-629X
pISSN - 0810-5391
DOI - 10.1111/acfi.12381
Subject(s) - dissent , shareholder , accounting , business , economics , corporate governance , finance , political science , law , politics
This article analyses whether the transition from the 2004 CLERP 9 advisory Say‐on‐Pay regime to the ‘Two Strikes’ rule in 2012 influenced CEO pay in Australian firms. Analysing a panel of 2,074 firm‐years (2005–2015), we find that (i) CEO pay is a positive predictor of shareholder dissent; (ii) firm performance has a reducing effect on shareholder dissent; (iii) excessive shareholder dissent moderated CEO pay under the ‘Two Strikes’ rule relative to the CLERP 9 regime, and (iv) the market responded favourably to the introduction of the ‘Two Strikes’ rule and negatively to ‘strike’ instances after its introduction.