Anticompetitive Employment

Scholars, antitrust agencies, and policy makers have historically paid little attention to anticompetitive practices in labor markets. This was largely due a misconception that antitrust law is meant to govern conventional markets in which goods and services trade, rather than govern labor markets. Antitrust law may also offer a poor remedy to redress employers who enter no‐poaching agreements or otherwise impair competition. The primary tension involves antitrust's purpose, which is to promote “consumer welfare.” To identify whether conduct eroded consumer welfare, courts tend to scrutinize whether prices increased. But here, lessening wages can enable firms to sell goods at cheaper prices, benefiting consumers. Another issue is that the typical restraint affects only a smattering of workers instead of lessening wages throughout the greater market. This article uses empirical analyses to show that antitrust should promote labor's welfare as it does consumer welfare, and it argues that enforcement must condemn labor cartels as per se illegal. The research demonstrates that labor cartels are more pernicious than restraints in product markets, as employers can lessen wages with less effort than in product markets. Antitrust should even proscribe no‐poaching agreements formed for a legitimate purpose (e.g., to protect trade secrets) because employers could have achieved the same goals using less coercive means; the noncompete agreement, at least, provides labor with a semblance of notice and bargaining power without drawing antitrust scrutiny. The prohibition of labor cartels would thus promote competition and consumer welfare, especially in minimum wage labor markets.