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Bank Failure, Mark‐to‐market and the Financial Crisis
Author(s) -
AmelZadeh Amir,
Meeks Geoff
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
abacus
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.632
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1467-6281
pISSN - 0001-3072
DOI - 10.1111/abac.12011
Subject(s) - balance sheet , fair value , economics , solvency , market value , market liquidity , fair market value , financial crisis , historical cost , value (mathematics) , mark to market accounting , monetary economics , accounting , financial accounting , accounting information system , macroeconomics , machine learning , computer science
This paper is concerned with the allegation that fair value accounting rules have contributed significantly to the recent financial crisis. It focuses on one particular channel for that contribution: the impact of fair value on the actual or potential failure of banks. The paper compares four criteria for failure: one economic, two legal and one regulatory. It is clear from this comparison that balance sheet valuations of assets are, in two cases, crucial in these definitions, and so the choice between ‘fair value’ or other valuations can be decisive in whether a bank fails; but in two cases fair value is irrelevant. Bank failures might arise despite capital adequacy and balance sheet solvency due to sudden shocks to liquidity positions. Two of the most prominent bank failures cannot, at first sight, be attributed to fair value accounting: we show that N orthern R ock was balance sheet solvent, even on a fair value basis, as was Lehman Brothers. The case study evidence is augmented by econometric tests that suggest that mark‐to‐market accounting has had only a very limited influence on the perceived failure risk of banks.