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Discussion of “Honor Among Thieves: Open Internal Reporting and Managerial Collusion”
Author(s) -
Glover Jonathan,
Kim Eunhee
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
contemporary accounting research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.769
H-Index - 99
eISSN - 1911-3846
pISSN - 0823-9150
DOI - 10.1111/1911-3846.12250
Subject(s) - collusion , sketch , honor , reciprocity (cultural anthropology) , contrast (vision) , positive economics , economics , psychology , stochastic game , social psychology , microeconomics , sociology , political science , epistemology , computer science , philosophy , artificial intelligence , algorithm , operating system
Evans, Moser, Newman, and Stikeleather (2016) use experiments of a one‐shot game to analyze the impact of open versus closed internal reporting on collusive managerial behavior. They interpret their results as inconsistent with economic theory. To better contrast their findings with economic theory and to expand their view of same, we sketch economic models capable of explaining many aspects of their results. We also critique the research design and offer an alternative payoff structure. We then relate their experiments to the seminal research of Berg, Dickhout, and McCabe (1995) on trust and reciprocity. Finally, we provide suggestions for further research.