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When Hedging Goes Wrong: Lessons from Ukraine’s Failed Hedge of the EU and Russia
Author(s) -
Smith Nicholas Ross
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
global policy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.602
H-Index - 33
eISSN - 1758-5899
pISSN - 1758-5880
DOI - 10.1111/1758-5899.12862
Subject(s) - geopolitics , foreign policy , hedge , political science , power (physics) , outcome (game theory) , international regime , economics , great power , political economy , international trade , international economics , economic system , law , politics , physics , mathematical economics , ecology , quantum mechanics , biology
When confronted by the competing zero‐sum regional strategies of the EU and Russia between 2010 and 2013, Ukraine chose to aggressively pursue a dual‐aligned hedge. This policy choice, in part, helped precipitate a disastrous outcome: the Ukraine crisis. Using the insights of the literature on smaller power hedging and regional security complex theory, it is argued that Viktor Yanukovych misperceived the geopolitical feedback emanating from the Eastern Europe security complex, leading it to pursuing a suboptimal foreign policy. Hedging was still the optimal foreign policy for Ukraine, but arguably a more modest form of hedging was required. It is argued that Ukraine’s experience raises important questions about the actorness of smaller powers to pursue hedging strategies in geopolitically‐charged regional security complexes.