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Collective Action to Avoid Catastrophe: When Countries Succeed, When They Fail, and Why
Author(s) -
Barrett Scott
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
global policy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.602
H-Index - 33
eISSN - 1758-5899
pISSN - 1758-5880
DOI - 10.1111/1758-5899.12324
Subject(s) - outcome (game theory) , collective action , action (physics) , relevance (law) , law and economics , simple (philosophy) , resistance (ecology) , economics , risk analysis (engineering) , political science , positive economics , business , microeconomics , law , epistemology , politics , ecology , philosophy , physics , quantum mechanics , biology
This article is concerned with situations in which avoiding a catastrophic outcome requires collective action. Using the logic of simple game theory, I identify circumstances that would cause rational players to act so as to guarantee that a catastrophe occurs, even when it is in their collective interests to avoid such an outcome – and when these players have the means at their disposal to ensure that such an outcome is avoided. I also identify circumstances that would cause rational players to act in concert to avert a catastrophe, and explain why other circumstances that might seem relevant to explaining these outcomes may be entirely inconsequential. Most of my discussion focuses on climate change. However, I also explain the relevance of the approach to three other areas: the millennium bug, drug resistance and nuclear arms control. In the final sections I discuss whether and how institutions might be designed to overcome, or at least reduce the likelihood of, catastrophic collective‐action failures at the international level.