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Selling strategic information in digital competitive markets
Author(s) -
Bounie David,
Dubus Antoine,
Waelbroeck Patrick
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
the rand journal of economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 3.687
H-Index - 108
eISSN - 1756-2171
pISSN - 0741-6261
DOI - 10.1111/1756-2171.12369
Subject(s) - business , price discrimination , competition (biology) , willingness to pay , information good , microeconomics , marketing , industrial organization , commerce , economics , the internet , ecology , world wide web , computer science , biology
Abstract This article investigates the strategies of a data broker selling information to one or to two competing firms. The data broker combines segments of the consumer demand that allow firms to third‐degree price discriminate consumers. We show that the data broker (1) sells information on consumers with the highest willingness to pay; (2) keeps consumers with low willingness to pay unidentified. The data broker strategically chooses to withhold information on consumer demand to soften competition between firms. These results hold under first‐degree price discrimination, which is a limit case when information is perfect.