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Interviewing in two‐sided matching markets
Author(s) -
Lee Robin S.,
Schwarz Michael
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
the rand journal of economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 3.687
H-Index - 108
eISSN - 1756-2171
pISSN - 0741-6261
DOI - 10.1111/1756-2171.12193
Subject(s) - interview , matching (statistics) , unemployment , set (abstract data type) , computer science , economics , microeconomics , business , sociology , mathematics , statistics , economic growth , anthropology , programming language
We introduce the interview assignment problem , which generalizes classic one‐to‐one matching models by introducing a stage of costly information acquisition. Firms learn preferences over workers via costly interviews. Even if all firms and workers conduct the same number of interviews, realized unemployment depends also on the extent to which agents share common interviewing partners. We introduce the concept of overlap that captures this notion and prove that unemployment is minimized with perfect overlap : that is, if two firms interview any common worker, they interview the exact same set of workers.