Premium
Competitive intelligence and disclosure
Author(s) -
Bagnoli Mark,
Watts Susan G.
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
the rand journal of economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 3.687
H-Index - 108
eISSN - 1756-2171
pISSN - 0741-6261
DOI - 10.1111/1756-2171.12103
Subject(s) - cournot competition , bertrand competition , competition (biology) , industrial organization , microeconomics , business , product differentiation , competitive intelligence , product (mathematics) , competitive advantage , economics , marketing , oligopoly , ecology , geometry , mathematics , biology
Competitive intelligence (CI) activities open new opportunities for firms to acquire and disclose information. We show that disclosure depends on the relative usefulness of information to the competing firms and is generally less (more) likely with Cournot (Bertrand) competition and when firms adopt product differentiation strategies. When CI costs are independent of information characteristics, each firm seeks information solely useful to itself and discloses it unless it is a Bertrand competitor with customer information. Only when the cost advantage is sufficiently great does each firm seek information useful to itself and its rival.