Premium
Strategic information revelation when experts compete to influence
Author(s) -
Bhattacharya Sourav,
Mukherjee Arijit
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
the rand journal of economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 3.687
H-Index - 108
eISSN - 1756-2171
pISSN - 0741-6261
DOI - 10.1111/1756-2171.12029
Subject(s) - ignorance , decision maker , persuasion , quality (philosophy) , set (abstract data type) , state (computer science) , cheap talk , decision quality , revelation , computer science , economics , microeconomics , operations research , political science , management science , psychology , law , knowledge management , social psychology , mathematics , epistemology , philosophy , algorithm , programming language , team effectiveness , art , literature
We consider a persuasion game between a decision‐maker and a set of experts. Each expert is identified by two parameters: (i) “quality” or his likelihood of observing the state (i.e., learning what the best decision is) and (ii) “agenda” or the preferred decision that is independent of the state. An informed expert may feign ignorance but cannot misreport. We offer a general characterization of the equilibrium. From the decision‐maker's standpoint, (a) higher quality is not necessarily better, (b) extreme agendas are always preferred, and (c) the optimal panel may involve experts with identical (rather than conflicting) agendas.