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HEURISTICS AND BIASES, RATIONAL CHOICE, AND SANCTION PERCEPTIONS *
Author(s) -
POGARSKY GREG,
ROCHE SEAN PATRICK,
PICKETT JUSTIN T.
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
criminology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 3.467
H-Index - 139
eISSN - 1745-9125
pISSN - 0011-1384
DOI - 10.1111/1745-9125.12129
Subject(s) - heuristics , perception , relevance (law) , psychology , cognitive bias , rational choice theory (criminology) , bayesian probability , anchoring , cognition , process (computing) , social psychology , cognitive psychology , computer science , criminology , artificial intelligence , political science , neuroscience , law , operating system
The relevance of several cognitive heuristics and related biases for rational choice perspectives on crime, and for perceptions of sanction risk, were investigated. We present findings from a series of randomized experiments, embedded in two nationwide surveys of American adults (18 and older) in 2015 ( N = 1,004 and 623). The results reveal that offender estimates of detection risk are less probabilistically precise and more situationally variable than under prevailing criminological perspectives, most notably, rational choice and Bayesian learning theories. This, in turn, allows various decision‐making heuristics—such as anchoring and availability—to influence and potentially bias the perceptual updating process.