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Deference and Defiance: The Shifting Rhythms of Executive‐Legislative Relations in Foreign Policy
Author(s) -
Lindsay James M.
Publication year - 2003
Publication title -
presidential studies quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.337
H-Index - 5
eISSN - 1741-5705
pISSN - 0360-4918
DOI - 10.1111/1741-5705.00005
Subject(s) - deference , foreign policy , legislature , political science , law , constitution , politics , foreign relations , power (physics) , separation of powers , law and economics , sociology , physics , quantum mechanics
The return of the deferential Congress after September 11 was another chapter in the fluctuating balance of power in executive‐legislative relations on foreign policy. The reason for this ebb and flow lies not in the Constitution but in politics. How aggressively Congress exercises its formal foreign policy powers turns foremost on whether the country sees itself as threatened or secure and to a lesser extent on how well the president handles foreign policy. Congress's action on the 2001 Use of Force Resolution, the 2002 Iraq Resolution, the U.S.A. Patriot Act, and other issues illustrates the nature of, and limits to, congressional deference.