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Motives in the Acquisitions of NASDAQ Targets during the Aftermath of the 1987 Crash
Author(s) -
Gondhalekar Vijay,
Bhagwat Yatin
Publication year - 2003
Publication title -
financial review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.621
H-Index - 47
eISSN - 1540-6288
pISSN - 0732-8516
DOI - 10.1111/1540-6288.00060
Subject(s) - crash , hubris , business , shareholder , agency (philosophy) , monetary economics , agency cost , financial system , finance , corporate governance , economics , philosophy , epistemology , computer science , history , programming language , classics
After the crash of 1987, the Nasdaq composite index stayed below the precrash level for nearly two years. Takeover activity surged in this after‐crash period. We compare the motives in the acquisitions of Nasdaq targets during the after‐crash period with those in the ten‐year period before the crash. We find that the announcement period return to acquirers and the proportion of acquirers with positive gains declines in the after‐crash period. For both the periods, agency is the motive for takeovers that have negative total gains (acquirer + target), but synergy and hubris are comotives for takeovers that have positive total gains. The proportion of takeovers in which the managers of acquirers act against the interest of the shareholders increases after the crash.