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Affiliation bias in the online market for rental accommodation
Author(s) -
Bliss Barbara A.,
Engelberg Joseph,
Warachka Mitch
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
real estate economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.064
H-Index - 61
eISSN - 1540-6229
pISSN - 1080-8620
DOI - 10.1111/1540-6229.12339
Subject(s) - renting , accommodation , listing (finance) , economics , relocation , taste , labour economics , advertising , business , finance , law , neuroscience , political science , computer science , programming language , chemistry , food science , biology
We find evidence of taste‐based discrimination against rival affiliations in the online market for rental accommodation. Airbnb hosts in college towns increase their listing prices more than hotels on home football games against rival teams. By setting listing prices too high as a result of their affiliation bias against rival fans, hosts experience a 30% reduction in rental income. The overestimation of demand, the cost (inconvenience) of temporary relocation, and the likelihood of incurring damage cannot explain the inverse relation between listing price increases, and rental incomes that is limited to games against rival teams. Instead, greater financial constraints are associated with smaller listing price increases, and higher rental incomes on rival games, suggesting that taste‐based discrimination is a luxury.