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Tenant Protection, Temporal Vacancy and Frequent Reconstruction in the Rental Housing Market
Author(s) -
Suzuki Masatomo,
Asami Yasushi
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
real estate economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.064
H-Index - 61
eISSN - 1540-6229
pISSN - 1080-8620
DOI - 10.1111/1540-6229.12205
Subject(s) - eviction , lease , inefficiency , renting , term (time) , rental housing , leasehold estate , business , economics , landlord , labour economics , finance , microeconomics , law , physics , quantum mechanics , political science
In Japan, tenants are protected in the sense that owners must compensate them for evicting them against their will, while owners cannot foresee the intended tenure length of prospective tenants. If owners cannot specify the term of a lease, social inefficiency emerges: (i) detached houses owned by individual households remain vacant for a certain period; (ii) alternatively, landlords’ newly constructed apartments, which are free from eviction risk, accommodate a large proportion of tenants; and (iii) the apartments are rebuilt frequently even though they remain viable. If a fixed‐term contract is available, only short‐term tenants choose it, and the information asymmetry is dissolved, realizing social efficiency.