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Do Owners Take Better Care of Their Housing Than Renters?
Author(s) -
Harding John,
Miceli Thomas J.,
Sirmans C.F.
Publication year - 2000
Publication title -
real estate economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.064
H-Index - 61
eISSN - 1540-6229
pISSN - 1080-8620
DOI - 10.1111/1540-6229.00815
Subject(s) - externality , rental housing , incentive , renting , economics , liability , public economics , microeconomics , business , labour economics , finance , law , political science
According to conventional wisdom, homeowners take better care of their housing than do renters, as a result of the rental externality. We argue that two forms of homeowner externality ootentially create similar incentives for owners to undermaintain their housing. The first is due to the inability of prospective buyers to fully observe past seller maintenance, and the second is a result of the limited liability of borrowers in the event of mortgage default. Empirical analysis verifies the existence of the mortgage externality, but we find no evidence for the resale externality.