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The Budget‐Minimizing Bureaucrat? Empirical Evidence from the Senior Executive Service
Author(s) -
Dolan Julie
Publication year - 2002
Publication title -
public administration review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.721
H-Index - 139
eISSN - 1540-6210
pISSN - 0033-3352
DOI - 10.1111/1540-6210.00153
Subject(s) - bureaucracy , government (linguistics) , public service , democracy , economics , public administration , government spending , power (physics) , executive branch , public economics , service (business) , federal budget , control (management) , political science , politics , management , law , finance , fiscal year , philosophy , linguistics , physics , economy , quantum mechanics , welfare , market economy
In a representative democracy, we assume the populace exerts some control over the actions and outputs of government officials, ensuring they comport with public preferences. However, the growth of the fourth branch of government has created a paradox: Unelected bureaucrats now have the power to affect government decisions (Meier 1993; Rourke 1984; Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman 1981). In this article, I rely on two competing theories of bureaucratic behavior‐representative‐bureaucracy theory and Niskanen's budget‐maximization theory‐to assess how well the top ranks of the federal government represent the demands of the citizenry. Focusing on federal‐spending priorities, I assess whether Senior Executive Service (SES) members mirror the attitudes of the populace or are likely to inflate budgets for their own personal gain. Contrary to the popular portrayal of the budget‐maximizing bureaucrat (Niskanen 1971), I find these federal administrators prefer less spending than the public on most broad spending categories, even on issues that fall within their own departments' jurisdictions. As such, it may be time to revise our theories about bureaucratic self‐interest and spending priorities.