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State Legislators and State Auditors: Is There an Inherent Role Conflict?
Author(s) -
Walton Karen Schuele,
Brown Richard E.
Publication year - 1990
Publication title -
public budgeting and finance
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.694
H-Index - 30
eISSN - 1540-5850
pISSN - 0275-1100
DOI - 10.1111/1540-5850.00846
Subject(s) - legislature , audit , state (computer science) , accounting , control (management) , business , external auditor , function (biology) , political science , internal audit , law , economics , management , computer science , algorithm , evolutionary biology , biology
Traditionally, one of the functions of state legislatures has been that of oversight. However, because it is the least rewarding, legislatures have paid it the least attention. This has led to increased responsibilities for state auditors. In many cases, their role has expanded from an examination of financial transactions and internal control to include the oversight functions previously performed by the legislatures. The result has been considerable auditor‐legislative tensions. This study surveyed state auditors to determine potential areas of conflict between auditors and legislatures. It found the major areas of conflict include inaction by legislators on the findings and recommendations of auditors and attempts at inappropriate control over the audit function by legislatures.