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Ceo Compensation And The Transformation Of Banking
Author(s) -
Harjoto Maretno A.,
Mullineaux Donald J.
Publication year - 2003
Publication title -
journal of financial research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.319
H-Index - 49
eISSN - 1475-6803
pISSN - 0270-2592
DOI - 10.1111/1475-6803.00062
Subject(s) - leverage (statistics) , incentive , underwriting , compensation (psychology) , executive compensation , business , principal–agent problem , monetary economics , investment banking , economics , financial system , finance , microeconomics , psychology , corporate governance , machine learning , computer science , psychoanalysis
We examine the compensation strategies of commercial bank holding companies (BHCs) during 1992–2000. In particular, we analyze whether CEO compensation is more closely tied to the presence of growth options and to risk than is revealed in earlier research. We also examine whether BHC entry into investment banking has influenced compensation policies. Our evidence shows a stronger link between growth options and CEO compensation in the 1990s than observed in earlier studies and that pay‐for‐performance sensitivities are substantially larger for BHCs that have entered the underwriting business. We also find that BHC leverage and variability in returns have positive effects on CEO incentive pay. Finally, we find some evidence supporting the hypothesis that pay‐for‐performance sensitivities decline generally at BHCs as return variability increases, as agency theory predicts.