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How Do Market Prices and Cheap Talk Affect Coordination?
Author(s) -
QU HONG
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
journal of accounting research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 6.767
H-Index - 141
eISSN - 1475-679X
pISSN - 0021-8456
DOI - 10.1111/1475-679x.12020
Subject(s) - cheap talk , affect (linguistics) , coordination game , investment (military) , business , market liquidity , coordination failure , microeconomics , investment decisions , industrial organization , global game , economics , monetary economics , production (economics) , linguistics , philosophy , politics , political science , law
In many scenarios such as banking and liquidity crises, inefficiencies often arise because investors face uncertainties about economic fundamentals and the strategies of other investors. How information affects fundamental uncertainty is well studied, but how information affects strategic uncertainty is underexplored. This paper examines how two communication mechanisms, market and cheap talk, affect investment decisions and efficiency in an experimental investment game with both fundamental and strategic uncertainty. I find that the market does not improve coordination because the expectation that coordination failures will occur is self‐fulfilling, while cheap talk improves coordination because the signals of willingness to invest alleviate strategic uncertainty.