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Earnings Manipulation and the Cost of Capital
Author(s) -
STROBL GÜNTER
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
journal of accounting research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 6.767
H-Index - 141
eISSN - 1475-679X
pISSN - 0021-8456
DOI - 10.1111/1475-679x.12008
Subject(s) - earnings , agency cost , incentive , diversification (marketing strategy) , earnings response coefficient , cost of capital , enterprise value , monetary economics , business , cash flow , earnings management , economics , stock (firearms) , finance , microeconomics , corporate governance , shareholder , mechanical engineering , marketing , engineering
The widespread use of accounting information by investors and financial analysts to help value stocks creates an incentive for managers to manipulate earnings in an attempt to influence short‐term stock price performance. This paper examines the role of earnings management in affecting a firm's cost of capital. Using an agency model with multiple firms whose cash flows are correlated, we demonstrate that the extent of earnings manipulation varies across the business cycle. Depending on a firm's earnings profile, it can have stronger incentives to overstate its performance in good times or in bad times. Because of this dependence on the state of the economy, earnings manipulation can influence a firm's cost of capital despite the forces of diversification.