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The effects of coding intensity in Medicare Advantage on plan benefits and finances
Author(s) -
Jacobs Paul D.,
Kronick Richard
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
health services research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.706
H-Index - 121
eISSN - 1475-6773
pISSN - 0017-9124
DOI - 10.1111/1475-6773.13591
Subject(s) - prescription drug , beneficiary , medicare part d , medicaid , health plan , actuarial science , medical prescription , medicine , medicare advantage , medical expenditure panel survey , business , health care , health insurance , finance , economics , nursing , economic growth
Abstract Objective To assess how beneficiary premiums, expected out‐of‐pocket costs, and plan finances in the Medicare Advantage (MA) market are related to coding intensity. Data Sources/Study Setting MA plan characteristics and administrative records from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) for the sample of beneficiaries enrolled in both MA and Part D between 2008 and 2015. Medicare claims and drug utilization data for Traditional Medicare (TM) beneficiaries were used to calibrate an independent measure of health risk. Study Design Coding intensity was measured by comparing the CMS risk score for each MA contract with a contract level risk score developed using prescription drug data. We conducted regressions of plan outcomes, estimating the relationship between outcomes and coding intensity. To develop prescription drug scores, we assigned therapeutic classes to beneficiaries based on their prescription drug utilization. We then regressed nondrug spending for TM beneficiaries in 2015 on demographic and therapeutic class identifiers for 2014 and used the coefficients to predict relative risk. Principal Findings We found that, for each $1 increase in potential revenue resulting from coding intensity, MA plan bid submissions declined by $0.10 to $0.19, and another $0.21 to $0.45 went toward reducing plans’ medical loss ratios, an indication of higher profitability. We found only a small impact on beneficiary's projected out‐of‐pocket costs in a plan, which serves as a measure of the generosity of plan benefits, and a $0.11 to $0.16 reduction in premiums. As expected, coding intensity's effect on bids was substantially larger in counties with higher levels of MA competition than in less competitive counties. Conclusions While coding intensity increases taxpayers’ costs of the MA program, enrollees and plans both benefit but with larger gains for plans. The adoption of policies to more completely adjust for coding intensity would likely affect both beneficiaries and plan profits.