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Representation or abdication? How citizens use institutions to help delegation succeed
Author(s) -
LUPIA ARTHUR,
MCCUBBINS MATHEW D.
Publication year - 2000
Publication title -
european journal of political research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 3.267
H-Index - 95
eISSN - 1475-6765
pISSN - 0304-4130
DOI - 10.1111/1475-6765.00514
Subject(s) - abdication , delegation , legislature , bureaucracy , statement (logic) , representation (politics) , simple (philosophy) , law and economics , political science , democracy , public administration , public relations , business , economics , law , epistemology , politics , philosophy
. Modern democracy requires delegation. One problem with delegation is that principals and agents often have conflicting interests. A second problem is that principals lack information about their agents. Many scholars conclude that these problems cause delegation to become abdication. We reject this conclusion and introduce a theory of delegation that supports a different conclusion. The theory clarifies when interest conflicts and information problems do (and do not) turn delegation into abdication. We conclude by arguing that remedies for common delegation problems can be embedded in the design of electoral, legislative, and bureaucratic institutions. The culmination of our efforts is a simple, but general, statement about when citizens and legislators can (and cannot) control their agents.