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Avoiding the ‘joint‐decision trap’: Lessons from intergovernmental relations in Scandinavia
Author(s) -
BLOMHANSEN JENS
Publication year - 1999
Publication title -
european journal of political research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 3.267
H-Index - 95
eISSN - 1475-6765
pISSN - 0304-4130
DOI - 10.1111/1475-6765.00441
Subject(s) - argument (complex analysis) , joint (building) , inefficiency , federalism , government (linguistics) , trap (plumbing) , political science , european union , asset (computer security) , german , positive economics , economics , law and economics , sociology , law , politics , economic policy , microeconomics , history , computer science , architectural engineering , biochemistry , chemistry , linguistics , philosophy , computer security , archaeology , environmental engineering , engineering
. This essay provides a critical assessment of an important contribution to the debate on institutional efficiency and inefficiency in European policy–making: the thesis on the ‘joint–decision trap’. This trap was identified by Fritz W. Scharpf, first in German federalism and later in policy–making in the European Union. The essay argues that joint–decision traps may be a much more prevalent phenomenon than envisaged by Scharpf. However, the essay demonstrates that joint–decision traps are not inherent to joint–decision systems. The basic argument of the essay is that the effects of joint–decision systems on public policy is contingent upon the central government's ability to threaten intergovernmental actors with exit. If this is possible, joint–decision systems turn into an asset. This argument is made on the basis of an analysis of intergovernmental relations in Sweden, Norway, and Denmark and a comparison of the Scandinavian systems with those of France and Germany.