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Public choice in political markets: The absence of quid pro quo
Author(s) -
JONES PHILIP
Publication year - 2003
Publication title -
european journal of political research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 3.267
H-Index - 95
eISSN - 1475-6765
pISSN - 0304-4130
DOI - 10.1111/1475-6765.00075
Subject(s) - status quo , incentive , politics , homo economicus , economics , value (mathematics) , public good , democracy , positive economics , perception , sovereignty , public choice , outcome (game theory) , microeconomics , public economics , social psychology , political science , psychology , market economy , law , machine learning , neuroscience , computer science
. Public choice analysts argue that, while incentive mechanisms in competitive markets ensure consumer sovereignty, decisions in political processes conflict with voters’ preferences. Voters are vulnerable because they are rationally apathetic. Yet, if this is so, how can high participation rates be explained? Evidence reveals that, in the absence of effective quid pro quo , behaviour differs systematically from that predicted of homo economicus . Here it is argued that, while participation cannot be explained in terms of an instrumental act (to affect outcome ), it can be explained in terms of individuals’ perceptions of the intrinsic value of the process itself. It follows that inherent mechanisms within representative democracy are capable of mitigating the more ‘dismal’ predictions of public choice analysis.