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Bank Capital Regulation with Asymmetric Countries
Author(s) -
Eldridge Damien S.,
Ryoo Heajin H.,
Wieneke Axel
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
economic record
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.365
H-Index - 42
eISSN - 1475-4932
pISSN - 0013-0249
DOI - 10.1111/1475-4932.12152
Subject(s) - enforcement , interest rate , profitability index , business , incentive , loan , financial system , monetary economics , capital (architecture) , financial market , finance , international economics , economics , market economy , archaeology , political science , law , history
When financial markets are global, the impacts of national banking regulations extend beyond national borders. While lax regulatory enforcement improves the profitability of home banks, it also increases loan supply, which in turn reduces the global interest rate spreads. In a two‐country model we show that each regulator's enforcement choice is affected by the relative size of the national financial market. An authority regulating a smaller market has a smaller impact on global interest rates and therefore a stronger incentive to relax regulatory enforcement.