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Trade, Wages and Unemployment in the Presence of Hiring and Firing Costs
Author(s) -
Oslington Paul
Publication year - 2002
Publication title -
economic record
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.365
H-Index - 42
eISSN - 1475-4932
pISSN - 0013-0249
DOI - 10.1111/1475-4932.00023
Subject(s) - unemployment , economics , wage bargaining , labour economics , wage inequality , inequality , wage , bargaining power , production (economics) , efficiency wage , macroeconomics , microeconomics , mathematical analysis , mathematics
This paper offers a new explanation of the recent Australian wage inequality and unemployment experience. Building on a standard international trade model, it is argued that trade affects wage inequality and unemployment through changes in the bargaining power of different groups of workers in the presence of hiring and firing costs. This allows previously puzzling aspects of the trends to be explained, including the inconsistency of the existing Stolper‐Samuelson trade explanation with rising relative skilled wages at the same time as rising skilled labour intensity of production. Considering differences in labour market institutions, in particular hiring and firing costs and minimum wages, allows differences between the experiences of Australia, the USA and Europe to be explained.

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