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Negotiations with Incomplete Information
Author(s) -
Wang Muhong,
Liu Renjing,
Wang Yingluo
Publication year - 2001
Publication title -
international transactions in operational research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.032
H-Index - 52
eISSN - 1475-3995
pISSN - 0969-6016
DOI - 10.1111/1475-3995.t01-1-00332
Subject(s) - negotiation , complete information , negotiation theory , business , computer science , international trade , microeconomics , knowledge management , management science , economics , process management , political science , law
In recent years, bargaining and negotiations have become areas of growing interest to researchers in business, management, and international trade. Decision‐makers in negotiations often do not have complete information about the situation and, therefore, may misunderstand the true intention of their opponents. In this paper, the negotiations on an international economic zone development project are modeled as hypergames, and analyzed by various solution concepts to study the role of misperception in negotiation interactions. Multiple levels of hypergame and sensitivity analysis are explored to find the best strategy that may help the parties to overcome their mistrust and reach the best cooperative solution.