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Distributed Social Dilemma With Competitive Meta‐players
Author(s) -
Yamashita Tomohisa,
Suzuki Keiji,
Ohuchi Azuma
Publication year - 2001
Publication title -
international transactions in operational research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.032
H-Index - 52
eISSN - 1475-3995
pISSN - 0969-6016
DOI - 10.1111/1475-3995.00007
Subject(s) - dilemma , social dilemma , computer science , order (exchange) , meta analysis , preference , superrationality , game theory , microeconomics , prisoner's dilemma , economics , mathematics , medicine , geometry , finance
In our research, we propose the solution to the ‘Distributed Social Dilemma’ as an extended social dilemma model. In this model, in order to prevent the players from becoming freeloaders, we introduce competitive meta‐players. Our purpose is to evaluate, through agent‐based simulation, how the meta‐players effect to increase cooperation amongst players in a distributed social dilemma. In order to examine our proposed solution, we introduce the preference of the players to cooperate as the measure of the effect of the meta‐players. On the basis of the result of the simulations, we show the degree of the effect of the competitive meta‐players on the distribution social dilemma.

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