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Explaining the Treaty of Amsterdam: Interests, Influence, Institutions
Author(s) -
Moravcsik Andrew,
Nicolaïdis Kalypso
Publication year - 1999
Publication title -
jcms: journal of common market studies
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.54
H-Index - 90
eISSN - 1468-5965
pISSN - 0021-9886
DOI - 10.1111/1468-5965.00150
Subject(s) - negotiation , ambiguity , delegate , treaty , economics , political science , sovereignty , technocracy , law and economics , stalemate , outcome (game theory) , positive economics , law , microeconomics , politics , philosophy , linguistics , computer science , programming language
This article offers a basic explanation of the process and outcome of negotiating the Treaty of Amsterdam. We pose three questions: What explains the national preferences of the major governments? Given those substantive national preferences, what explains bargaining outcomes among them? Given those substantive bargains, what explains the choice of international institutions to implement them? We argue in favour of an explanation based on three elements. Issue‐specific interdependence explains national preferences. Interstate bargaining based on asymmetrical interdependence explains the outcomes of substantive negotiation. The need for credible commitments explains institutional choices to pool and delegate sovereignty. Other oft‐cited factors – European ideology, supranational entrepreneurship, technocratic considerations, or the random flux and non‐rational processes of ‘garbage can’ decision‐making – play secondary roles. Remaining areas of ambiguity are flagged for future research.