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US Evidence on Bank Takeover Motives: A Note
Author(s) -
Zhang Hao
Publication year - 1998
Publication title -
journal of business finance and accounting
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.282
H-Index - 77
eISSN - 1468-5957
pISSN - 0306-686X
DOI - 10.1111/1468-5957.00224
Subject(s) - hubris , economics , agency (philosophy) , empirical evidence , monetary economics , agency cost , principal–agent problem , microeconomics , corporate governance , finance , shareholder , sociology , philosophy , social science , theology , epistemology
Existing studies on bank takeovers have not been able to distinguish among the three competing motives: synergy, agency, and hubris. This paper distinguishes the three competing motives by examining the relations between target gains and total gains and between acquirer gains and target gains. Empirical results show that bank takeovers are primarily motivated by synergy, although there is also strong evidence of hubris. Our results also suggest that hubris may explain the positive target gains and zero or negative acquirer gains found in this and many other bank takeover studies. Lastly, evidence exists to suggest that agency, along with hubris, may explain takeovers with negative total gains (JEL G21, G34).