Is (Merely) Stalking Sentient Animals Morally Wrong?

Such activities as tracking, watching, and photographing animals are frequently presented as morally superior alternatives to hunting, but could they themselves be morally problematic? In this paper I argue that, despite certain differences from the stalking of humans, a strong case can be made for the prima facie wrongness of stalking sentient animals. The chief harm of stalking is the fear and altered patterns of behaviour which it forces upon its victims. Similar harms arise for both human and non‐human victims of stalking; thus I argue thatstalking animals is a prima facie, but overridable wrong. Still, a significant disanalogy between stalking humans and stalking animals can be seen in cases in which the victim is unaware of being stalked. I argue that such stalking is generally acceptable with respect to animals, but morally wrong with respect to humans. More generally, it is much harder to justify the stalking of humans than the stalking of animals, given the greater human interest in privacy.