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Interpreting Surrogate Consent using Counterfactuals
Author(s) -
Barnbaum Deborah
Publication year - 1999
Publication title -
journal of applied philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.339
H-Index - 30
eISSN - 1468-5930
pISSN - 0264-3758
DOI - 10.1111/1468-5930.00118
Subject(s) - interpretation (philosophy) , directive , counterexample , epistemology , counterfactual conditional , clinical judgment , law , counterfactual thinking , philosophy , psychology , political science , computer science , medicine , mathematics , linguistics , discrete mathematics , medical physics , programming language
Philosophers such as Dan Brock believe that surrogates who make health care decisions on behalf of previously competent patients, in the absence of an advance directive, should make these decisions based upon a substituted judgment principle. Brock favours substituted judgment over a best interests standard. However, Edward Wierenga claims that the substituted judgment principle ought to be abandoned in favour of a best interests standard, because of an inherent problem with the substituted judgment principle. Wierenga's version of the substituted judgment principle and his counterexample to the principle's successful interpretation of valid surrogate consent is presented. A new version of what is meant by the substituted judgment principle is advanced. The new version is not beset with the problems Wierenga initially ascribed to the substituted judgment principle.