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Uniqueness, Individuality, and Human Cloning
Author(s) -
Elliott David
Publication year - 1998
Publication title -
journal of applied philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.339
H-Index - 30
eISSN - 1468-5930
pISSN - 0264-3758
DOI - 10.1111/1468-5930.00092
Subject(s) - uniqueness , human cloning , cloning (programming) , value (mathematics) , epistemology , selection (genetic algorithm) , sociology , environmental ethics , social psychology , psychology , law , philosophy , computer science , political science , artificial intelligence , machine learning , programming language
This paper challenges two main arguments often presented to show that cloning a human being would be morally wrong per se . These arguments are that human cloning would be intrinsically wrong 1) because it involves manufacturing a person rather than creating or reproducing one, and 2) because it violates some claim or right that individuals have to be biologically unique. I argue that while cloning may involve genetic selection, it need not always be a decision to select for a certain type of individual. Furthermore, I contend that the notion of biological uniqueness is inadequate to ground either the idea that biologically non‐unique individuals are morally worse off than unique ones or that biological uniqueness itself constitutes a criterion of moral value or status.