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Killing and Relevantly Similarly Letting Die
Author(s) -
DavsonGalle Peter
Publication year - 1998
Publication title -
journal of applied philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.339
H-Index - 30
eISSN - 1468-5930
pISSN - 0264-3758
DOI - 10.1111/1468-5930.00087
Subject(s) - contest , philosophy , epistemology , law and economics , set (abstract data type) , point (geometry) , sociology , law , political science , theology , computer science , mathematics , geometry , programming language
Winston Nesbitt has argued that the usual examples appealed to as supporting the view that killing is no worse than letting die are misleading in that the comparison cases are not set up properly to tap our intuitions. Making various adjustments to the cases he judges killing to be intuitively worse than letting die and suggests that such a result is meta‐ethically appropriate to one view of the point of ethics. I contest each of these claims.