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Models of federal power sharing
Author(s) -
Watts Ronald
Publication year - 2001
Publication title -
international social science journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.237
H-Index - 43
eISSN - 1468-2451
pISSN - 0020-8701
DOI - 10.1111/1468-2451.00289
Subject(s) - polity , politics , appeal , legislature , diversity (politics) , political science , power (physics) , public administration , political economy , sociology , law , physics , quantum mechanics
Concurrent contemporary pressures for both larger and smaller political units have contributed to the appeal of federal political systems as a way of reconciling both these pressures and of accommodating social diversity within a polity. Among the major federal institutional models that have resulted have been unions, constitutionally decentralised unions, federations, confederations, federacies, associated states, condominiums, leagues, joint functional authorities, and hybrids. Furthermore, within each of these forms there has been considerable variation. Among federations, the issues in their design that have affected their operation have been: the number and character of the constituent units, the distribution of legislative and executive authority and financial resources, the degree of symmetry or asymmetry in the powers allocated to constituent units, the form and structure of the common federative institutions, the role of courts as adjudicative bodies, the constitutional recognition of individual and collective minority rights, and the processes for intergovernmental consultation, cooperation, and coordination. The successes and failures of federations during the past half‐century point to four major lessons, which have a bearing on the ability of federations and more broadly federal systems to reconcile and manage social diversity.

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