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A Note on Viable Proposals *
Author(s) -
Lauwers Luc
Publication year - 2002
Publication title -
international economic review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.658
H-Index - 86
eISSN - 1468-2354
pISSN - 0020-6598
DOI - 10.1111/1468-2354.t01-1-00059
Subject(s) - mathematical economics , stochastic game , set (abstract data type) , economics , game theory , law and economics , microeconomics , computer science , programming language
Sengupta and Sengupta (“Viable Proposals,” International Economic Review 35 (1994), 347–59.) consider a payoff vector of a TU‐game as a viable proposal if it challenges each legitimate contender. They show that for each game the set of viable proposals is nonempty. Their proof, however, has a flaw. I present a proof based upon a result by Kalai and Schmeidler (“An Admissible Set Occurring in Various Bargaining Situations,” Journal of Economic Theory 14 (1977), 402–11).