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LONG‐TERM CARE AND FAMILY BARGAINING*
Author(s) -
ENGERS MAXIM,
STERN STEVEN
Publication year - 2002
Publication title -
international economic review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.658
H-Index - 86
eISSN - 1468-2354
pISSN - 0020-6598
DOI - 10.1111/1468-2354.t01-1-00004
Subject(s) - term (time) , measure (data warehouse) , economics , econometrics , sensitivity (control systems) , actuarial science , test (biology) , long term care , computer science , psychology , engineering , physics , quantum mechanics , electronic engineering , paleontology , database , psychiatry , biology
We present a structural model of how families decide who should care for elderly parents. We use data from the National Long‐Term Care Survey to estimate and test the parameters of the model. Then we use the parameter estimates to simulate the effects of the existing long‐term trends in terms of the common but untested explanations for them. Finally, we simulate the effects of alternative family bargaining rules on individual utility to measure the sensitivity of our results to the family decision‐making assumptions we make.