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Transplants and Implants: The Economics of Self‐Improvement[Note 1. Manuscript received September 1999; revised August 2000. ...]
Author(s) -
Burdett Ken,
Coles Melvyn G.
Publication year - 2001
Publication title -
international economic review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.658
H-Index - 86
eISSN - 1468-2354
pISSN - 0020-6598
DOI - 10.1111/1468-2354.00126
Subject(s) - externality , pareto principle , economics , microeconomics , neoclassical economics , operations management
This article examines equilibrium self‐improvement and marriage proposal strategies in a two‐sided search model with nontransferable utility. Singles are vertically differentiated—some make better marriage partners than others. A complete characterization of equilibrium is provided. It is shown there are two externalities to self‐improvement decisions. Further, these externalities may support multiple Pareto rankable equilibria. By encouraging everybody to self‐improve, society can create a situation where everybody is forced to improve to remain “acceptable.” But a preferred equilibrium may exist where there is less (costly) self‐improvement.