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A Model of Declining Standards[Note 1. Various committee assignments helped to form my thoughts on ...]
Author(s) -
Sobel Joel
Publication year - 2000
Publication title -
international economic review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.658
H-Index - 86
eISSN - 1468-2354
pISSN - 0020-6598
DOI - 10.1111/1468-2354.00065
Subject(s) - elite , test (biology) , order (exchange) , computer science , econometrics , operations research , economics , mathematics , law , political science , paleontology , finance , politics , biology
This paper presents a model in which relative standing determines standards. There are three kinds of agents in the model: candidates who wish to pass a test, members of the elite who have passed the test, and the judge who decides who passes. In order to pass, a candidate's performance must be at least as good as the performance of a representative member of the elite. Without perturbations in the underlying data, the model predicts that standards will not change. Perturbations in the preferences used to judge candidates lead to a reduction in standards.

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