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Strict Liability for Police Nonfeasance? The K inghan R eport on the R iot ( D amages) A ct 1886
Author(s) -
Morgan Jonathan
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
the modern law review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.37
H-Index - 22
eISSN - 1468-2230
pISSN - 0026-7961
DOI - 10.1111/1468-2230.12073
Subject(s) - liability , position (finance) , compensation (psychology) , strict liability , duty , business , obligation , incentive , limited liability , law , law and economics , political science , economics , finance , microeconomics , psychology , psychoanalysis
The R iot ( D amages) A ct 1886 imposes a no‐fault obligation on police forces to compensate owners of property damaged in rioting. Following the riots across E ngland in 2011 an independent H ome O ffice review, the K inghan R eport, concluded that the fundamental principle of the A ct should be retained, while the machinery should be modernised. The R eport conceives of the A ct as a useful, if highly unusual, compensation scheme that may ease socio‐economic problems in riot‐prone areas. This article questions that position. Strict liability offers potential advantages in contentious claims against public authorities, providing an incentive for the police to perform their duty to keep the peace while averting the questioning of police decision‐making that claims in negligence would inevitably require. The best alternative to negligence liability might not be ‘no liability’ (the general position now at common law), or liability based on ‘serious fault’ (as the L aw C ommission proposed in 2008), but liability without fault.