Rationalism in Public Law

Rationalism is ‘the stylistic criterion of all respectable politics’. So lamented political philosopher M ichael O akeshott in a series of essays published in the 1940s and 1950s. Rationalism, for O akeshott, is shorthand for a propensity to prioritise the universal over the local, the uniform over the particular and, ultimately, principle over practice. It culminates in the triumph of abstract principles over practical knowledge in a manner that erodes our ability to engage in political activity. Although O akeshott's critique was made with the practice and study of politics in mind, it has a wider relevance. Rationalism, as we see it, has become the dominant style in public law. We draw upon O akeshott's critique to elucidate the risks associated with rationalism in public law and call for a renewed engagement with practical knowledge in the study of the constitution.