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Appeals to Reason
Author(s) -
Redmayne Mike
Publication year - 2002
Publication title -
the modern law review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.37
H-Index - 22
eISSN - 1468-2230
pISSN - 0026-7961
DOI - 10.1111/1468-2230.00364
Subject(s) - appeal , argument (complex analysis) , presumption , burden of proof , presumption of innocence , constructive , precondition , statistical evidence , constructive proof , epistemology , reasonable doubt , innocence , mathematical proof , law , psychology , political science , law and economics , sociology , philosophy , mathematics , computer science , biochemistry , chemistry , statistics , null hypothesis , geometry , process (computing) , discrete mathematics , programming language , operating system
This article considers how statistical reasoning changes conceptions of evidence and proof. Beginning with three Court of Appeal judgments in which proof is quantified, it traces the implications of statistical ways of thinking about proof through the law of criminal evidence. This leads to the bizarre conclusion that proof is, by and large, impossible. The argument then takes a more constructive turn. The way in which the presumption of innocence is conceptualised in statistical argument is criticised and it is suggested that proof depends on a precondition of trust in the way suspects are selected by the police. For that trust to be deserved, police suspects must be chosen in a legitimate manner.